

Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special Forces

**A Monograph
by
Major Paul A. Ott
United States Army Special Forces**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
AY 01-02**

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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Paul A. Ott

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Approved by:

Joseph G.D. Babb, MA

Monograph Director

COL James K. Greer, MMAS

Director, School of
Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Abstract

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: TRANSFORMING SPECIAL FORCES by Major Paul A. Ott, U.S. Army Special Forces, 63 pages.

The emphasis on special operations and specifically unconventional warfare (UW) has grown significantly since the end of the Gulf War. The contemporary operational environment (COE) in which the U.S. military operates today is dictating this emphasis. The COE is the complex global environment that exists today. It encompasses the effects of globalism, changes in the global power structure, the proliferation of technology and weapons of mass destruction, and the entire spectrum of threats that exist—from traditional nation-state actors to emerging non-state actors. The core purpose of Army Special Forces (SF) has been, and will continue to be UW. The ability to operate in this dynamic, ambiguous environment through, with, and by indigenous and surrogate forces often makes SF an ideal economy of force for operations in the COE.

This study looks at the SF organization to determine what changes are indicated from the COE for it to continue to provide a viable, effective UW capability. The study first analyzes the historical origins and evolution of the SF organization from World War II through the Gulf War. The study then defines and analyzes the COE and recent SF operations since the end of the Gulf War. From this analysis, the study identifies areas in which the SF organization needs to change in response to the COE.

The study identified the direct and indirect impacts on the SF organizational structure. Direct effects of the COE include personnel and training changes resulting from the increased emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) and information technologies for SF to operate effectively in the joint, multinational, and interagency environment. Indirect effects of the COE include increases in command and control, combat support, and combat service support assets required to conduct multiple, sustained special operations globally.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AOB – advanced operating base
ARSOTF – army special operations task force
C2 – command and control
C4I – command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
COE – contemporary operating environment
CS – combat support
CSS – combat service support
CST – coalition support team
CT – counterterrorism
DA – direct action
FID – foreign internal defense
FOB – forward operating base
HUMINT – human intelligence
JCO – joint commission observer
JSOTF – joint special operations task force
LCE – liaison coordination element
OOTW – operations other than war
OSS – Office of Strategic Services
PSYOP – psychological operations
SF – Special Forces
SFG – Special Forces Group
SFODA – Special Forces Operational Detachment A
SFODB – Special Forces Operational Detachment B
SOF – special operations forces
SR – special reconnaissance
USASFC – United States Army Special Forces Command
USASOC – United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM – United States Special Operations Command
UW – unconventional warfare
WMD – weapons of mass destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change...This reality means that USSOCOM must embrace and institutionalize the process of change in a disciplined manner that allows us to move closer to our vision. During this journey, only our core values are permanent and non-negotiable. Everything else--our organization, force structure, platforms, equipment, and missions--must continuously evolve to meet the needs of the nation and seize the opportunities brought about by change...To be relevant in the future, we must continue our transformation, while maintaining the readiness required to shape and respond to the world today. We need to anticipate trends and future scenarios, conditioning ourselves to not be surprised by surprise and the rapidity of change and the dynamics that follow. As new threats arise, we must decide which of our current capabilities to retain or modify, which new ones to develop, and which old ones to discard.¹

General Peter J. Schoomaker
Commander, USSOCOM

The world is rapidly changing and the United States Army, to include Army Special Operations Forces (SOF), is seeking ways to transform itself to meet the security challenges of the future. The changing global environment in the past decade has resulted in an increase in operations other than war (OOTW) and a corresponding increased demand for unconventional operations. The global war on terrorism will increase the number and scope of these types of operations even further. Army Special Forces must transform to meet these rising needs and the changing nature of the contemporary operating environment (COE).

Structure of the Study

Problem Statement

Does the current Special Forces organization need to change to meet operational needs in the contemporary operational environment? This study focuses on the requirement of the Army

¹ Peter J. Schoomaker, General, *Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead*, United States Special Operations Command homepage, <http://www.socom.mil/>, 1998; quoted in Ronald M. Johnson, "Application of Aspects of Unconventional Warfare: Tools for Engaging the Current and Future Threat Trends of the Post-Cold War Environment" (Masters thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 1.

Special Forces organization to adapt to emerging operational requirements in today's dynamic, uncertain, full-spectrum environment in order to continue providing a competent unconventional warfare (UW) capability for the military.

The organization of Army Special Forces has evolved over the years since its formation in the early 1950's. During the late 1950s and the Vietnam era, the organization saw significant growth and transformation. However, the organization of its basic tactical unit, the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA), is nearly unchanged. The current organization is arguably based on an out-dated, World War II era UW paradigm and is a model designed for the Cold War environment. Rapid advances in technology, changing capabilities of the conventional Army, operational experience across the spectrum of conflict, and changes in the threat over the past decade have redefined the operational requirements for SF. However, unconventional warfare (UW) will continue to be the unique purview of SF for the foreseeable future. It is imperative that Army SF community examines the organization as a whole to see where changes are needed, then aggressively transform the force to meet these needs.

This study looks at the contemporary operational environment (COE) and suggests changes needed in the Special Forces organization to continue providing a viable and effective UW capability. Is the organization of Army Special Forces adequate to meet the requirements of a new, dynamic, rapidly changing contemporary operational environment? Is the current structure capable of conducting sustained special operations in multiple theaters of operation? Are new military occupation specialties needed in SF to sustain the UW capability? Does Special Forces need to consider allowing women within its ranks?

Methodology

This monograph provides a brief historical analysis of the organization of Special Forces since its inception. This includes a review of Special Forces' origin in World War II with the

Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This section concludes with a detailed look at SF's current organization and missions.

Next, the monograph analyzes the contemporary operational environment with the intent of identifying specific SOF requirements. A review of the recently published material, including Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) white papers, the 1999 Hart-Rudman Commission Reports, and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provide the characteristics and trends of the operational environment that our military forces are expected to operate in. Recent operations, including those in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Afghan region are used to provide specific, real-world details and show the recurring UW nature of SF operations since the Gulf War.

This monograph is based on primary source material in the form of government documents and secondary sources such as books, journal and periodical articles, and monographs. Additionally, interviews with subject matter experts have been used whenever available to supplement the research.

Background and Significance

Since the end of the Cold War, the environment in which we operate and the threats we face have changed significantly. Consequently, the mission requirements for the United States' military forces have changed. The world is no longer a bipolar operational environment with clearly defined threats against which the United States can structure its military forces. As evidenced by the number and type of operations since the Gulf War, the end of the Cold War has brought anything but stability into the world. Historic ethnic conflicts, competition for scarce resources, criminal organizations, religious extremism, and terrorism are but a few of the forces that pose threats to stability now and into the foreseeable future. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review states, "the global security environment involves a great deal of uncertainty about the

potential sources of military threats, the conduct of war in the future, and the form that threats and attacks against the Nation will take.²

Future enemies of the United States may not adhere to the currently accepted conventions of warfare. Non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations will not be constrained by the laws of land warfare. They will not meet the United States on equal terms—rather, they will look for weaknesses in the security system of the United States to exploit while avoiding its proven lethal conventional military establishment.

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 translated what were once suppositions about the future asymmetric threat into stark realities in the American homeland. The threat, for which the United States must prepare and respond, is now much clearer. The need to affect homeland security by military actions overseas is greater. In light of several thousand civilian and military casualties at home, there will be fewer domestic constraints on U.S. military activities in support of national security. International relationships transformed practically overnight in response to the terrorist attacks. Countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, China, and Sudan showed an interest in cooperating with the U.S. in the wake of the terrorist attack, albeit limited given the tenuous relationships that they have maintained in recent years. Operations against terrorism have taken on a new, global scope that will challenge traditional command and control relationships, logistical support structures, and inter-agency cooperability.

The full spectrum of challenges, including asymmetric threats such as terrorism, facing the U.S. in this contemporary operational environment (COE) has been an impetus for change across the entire force for the past decade. The U.S. Army had already embarked on a major effort to transform itself into a capabilities-based objective force in order to respond to a wide spectrum of potential threats. Trying to transform amidst a reduction in the size of the military, increasingly

² Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001), 3.

tighter budgets, and a dynamic and uncertain threat has proven to be a difficult challenge. These dynamics are leaving some "legacy systems" and traditional capabilities struggling for relevance in the future force structure. Transformation efforts have accelerated rapidly in the past two years under Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki. The Army is not alone in its effort to prepare for the future - the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command are also studying and adopting new ways to organize, equip, and prepare for future operational requirements.

Over the past decade as the Army downsized, Special Forces were spared major cuts, but struggled to fill its authorized force structure. This was due largely to the significant decrease in the active duty Army from which Special Forces was able to recruit. The result was a reduction in the number of SFODAs per company, and even those remaining have struggled to operate at full strength. Sustaining special operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (the war on terrorism) worldwide will require a return to six SFODAs per company and possibly even further organizational growth and changes. The stimulus of September 11th has prompted increased funding for SOF and provides the opportunity to study, debate, and make appropriate organizational changes.

In the past, senior SF headquarters have studied changing the organizational structure several times. Until recently, most of the reviews have focused on the organization of the SFODA. In 1982, a four-man SFODA was proposed; in 1986, 1st Special Operation Command (SOCOM) reviewed the SFODA structure with regards to SF integration into Air-Land Battle doctrine; and in 1991, 1st Special Forces Group proposed a new organization with "four six-man detachments under a new layer of command called a troop" and three troops in a squadron.³ More recently, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) conducted significant research to develop a proposed SF objective force structure, with a fielding date to match the Army's goal of

³ James J. Starshak, "A Special Forces Operational Detachment for the 21st Century" (Masters thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 15-16.

2010.⁴ In September 2001, USASOC conducted the Special Forces Transformation Wargame to assess the proposed Objective Force Special Forces operational concepts, capabilities, and organizations.⁵ Additionally, the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) is developing an interim SF Group structure to bridge the gap between the existing force and the objective force. On 14 November 2001, the USASFC Commander was briefed on an interim design that would increase the size of the Special Forces Operational Detachment Bravo (SFODB), make authorized positions at battalion and group to replace the "padded" positions that consume SFODA personnel strength, and reorganize special support functions at the group level.⁶

The Army recognizes the current and future operational environment requires a force with more SOF-like capabilities. "The Army as a whole is becoming more like Special Forces as its deployment capabilities grow and its maneuver units handle a range of missions that expands into roles that previously were considered unconventional for them."⁷ Joint Vision 2020 states that the future challenges will require "a Total Force composed of well-educated, motivated, and competent people" that are capable of adapting to the ambiguous environment of the future.⁸

The extensive utilization of SOF in the 1990s shows that SOF UW skills are relevant and will be used in the future across the operational spectrum in a variety of operations. The issues at hand for SOF are enabling the force to conduct the number and scope of operations that will be required in the COE and adapting the force in order to sustain its UW capability in a changing world. This may require radical changes in the way SOF are resourced, structured, and operates.

⁴ United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), *Objective Force Concept and Wargame Results – Initial Report (DRAFT)* (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USASOC, 2001), 3.

⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁶ "Padded" positions are headquarters staff, training, administrative, and liaison slots that are not authorized positions in the table of organization and equipment (TOE). Typically, these positions are filled with personnel taken from SFODAs. United States Army Special Forces Command, *Interim Special Forces Transformation: USASFC(A) CG Decision Brief* (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USASFC(A), 14 November 2001).

⁷ Dennis Steele, "Unconventional Warfare: The Front Line of the Future," *Army* 51, no. 7 (July 2001): 30.

⁸ Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), 7.

SOF may truly need to be "PH.Ds with rucksacks" in order to conduct unconventional warfare in the future.⁹

The core purpose for the creation of Army Special Forces in the early 1950s was to conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW). Special Forces traces its core mission and organization to the UW organizations of World War II. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Jedburgh Teams and Operational Groups, and Detachment 101 worked in the European and China-India-Burma theaters organizing partisans and guerrillas to conduct military operations in the enemy rear areas. When the Cold War began, the United States realized the enormous potential of Special Forces units trained to conduct UW in fighting the spread of communism worldwide.

The initial post-World War II UW focus was on organizing partisans and guerilla forces behind enemy lines in Europe. This requirement spread to include other regions of the world as the United States realized the potential for UW in areas such as Southeast Asia. The definition of UW has evolved over the years to include a broad range of activities conducted in hostile or denied territory using indigenous personnel. Joint Pub 1-02 defines UW as:

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.¹⁰

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is working to re-define UW to better describe its employment in the COE. The USASOC Integrated Concept Team (ICT) developing the Objective Force Special Forces concepts categorized all Special Forces missions under the umbrella term Unconventional Operations. From this, the missions are

⁹ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 92-97. In their book, the Tofflers describe niche warfare as smaller wars that have replaced large-scale conventional wars characteristic of the industrial age. This form of warfare is in response to the distribution of threats caused by a single global superpower and the effects of the information age. Unconventional warfare (UW) skills of Special Forces are ideally suited for conducting this type of warfare.

¹⁰ Department of the Defense, *Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and*

divided into three sub-categories: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and U.S. Unilateral Missions. Table 1 shows how USASOC categorizes current SF missions within this evolving doctrinal framework.

Unconventional Operations				
Unconventional Warfare		Foreign Internal Defense		US Unilateral Missions
Guerrilla Warfare	Personnel Recovery	Security Assistance	Humanitarian Assistance	Direct Action Counter-Terrorism
Subversion	Sabotage	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations	Humanitarian Demining Operations	Sabotage Personnel Recovery
Coalition Support				
Direct Action	Special Reconnaissance	Counter-Narcotics	Anti-Terrorism	Special Reconnaissance
Counter-Terrorism		Training Assistance	Counter-Terrorism	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
Other missions as required		Other missions as required	Counter Insurgency Ops	Other missions as required

Table 1: Special Forces Mission Categories¹¹

By law, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only military organization authorized to conduct UW.¹² Within USSOCOM, the Army's Special Forces is the primary force for this mission. In his book *US Special Operations Forces in Action*, Thomas K. Adams states that "the military organization most capable of conducting UW, and the only organization with a record of success in UW, is U.S. Army Special Forces."¹³ Although the environment has changed and missions have evolved, the core capability that SF provides the military remains unchanged—UW. The *raison d'être* for Army Special Forces is "its ability to operate through, with, or by surrogates, indigenous populations and indigenous organizations."¹⁴ This capability is as important today as ever.

Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 451.

¹¹ USASOC, 4.

¹² *US Code, Title 10, Section 167.*

¹³ Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 302.

¹⁴ Mark D. Boyatt, Colonel (Retired), "Special Forces: Our Core Purpose," *Special Warfare* 14, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 8.

As the Army transforms itself from the legacy force to the objective force, it is imperative that Special Forces transform as well. The transformation of the Army was well on its way, but September 11th increased the pace, breadth, depth, and support for change. The requirement for Special Forces' unique capabilities is clearly a part of future military strategies across the spectrum of conflict, as stated in the recent QDR and evidenced by the operations in Afghanistan. Forward deployed, capable, theater engagement forces will be required to achieve the defense policy goals specified in the QDR.¹⁵ Army Special Forces has, and will continue to provide the efficient, economy of force capability to support this strategy. The 1997 National Military Strategy states the need for a UW capability that will certainly continue to grow in the future:

The range of challenges to our security demands an ability to influence certain events with forces that are smaller and less visible than conventional formations, offering the NCA [National Command Authorities] options that do not entail a major military commitment. Special Operations Forces provide this capability and offer unique skills, tactics, and systems for the execution of unconventional, potentially high-payoff missions.¹⁶

¹⁵ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 11. The four defense policy goals are: Assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and; if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

¹⁶ General John Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era*, online: <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/>; reprinted by the United States Army Command and General Staff College, *National Military Strategy* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), 16.

CHAPTER 2

THE SPECIAL FORCES ORGANIZATION

*"When the hour of crisis comes, remember that forty selected men can shake the world."*¹⁷

Yasotay
Mongolian Warlord

Historical Origins

Officially, Special Forces traces its lineage to elite special purpose units including Rogers' Rangers from the French and Indian Wars and the First Special Service Force, a combined American and Canadian unit organized primarily to conduct direct action operations in the cold, mountainous, snow-covered regions of the European Theater of Operation.¹⁸ However, Special Forces finds its true operational roots in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in WWII.

President Roosevelt initially established the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) under the direction of Colonel William J. Donovan in July 1941. The organization was based on Donovan's recommendation to create "a single agency to centralize the intelligence gathered by several uncoordinated offices in Washington, combining the functions of psychological warfare and special operations on the British model."¹⁹ The COI was divided into two primary sections: Research and Analysis (R&A) and the Foreign Information Service (FIS).²⁰

In June 1942, President Roosevelt redesignated the COI as the OSS with an emphasis on conducting UW behind enemy lines in Europe, similar to the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) model. Donovan organized the OSS into intelligence, special operations, and training sections.²¹ Over the course of the war, the OSS organized three distinct special

¹⁷ Quoted most recently in Robin Neillands, *In the Combat Zone: Special Forces since 1945* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), 1.

¹⁸ Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 63.

¹⁹ Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *US Army Special Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), 5.

²⁰ Ibid., 6.

²¹ Ibid., 25.

operations elements that operated in the European and China-India-Burma Theaters of Operations; these were the OSS Jedburgh Teams, Operational Groups, and Detachment 101.²²

Detachment 101 was activated on 14 April 1942 to conduct operations in Burma under the command of General Joseph Stilwell. These elements recruited, organized, equipped, and trained Burmese fighters from the Kachin tribe to conduct operations against Japanese forces.²³ Perhaps more than any of the other OSS elements, Detachment 101 developed a firm appreciation for the complexities of establishing credibility, winning trust and confidence, and organizing guerrillas into effective fighting units. The experiences and lessons learned by Detachment 101 became fundamental to later UW doctrine.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized the formation of the OSS Operational Groups (OGs) beginning 23 December 1942 for specific operations in Europe. These units, consisting of thirty enlisted soldiers and four officers, are the truest forerunners of today's Special Forces Operational Detachments Alpha (SFODA). "The OGs were parachuted or sea infiltrated behind German lines in Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, and France. [They] were able to conduct raids and operations without extensive partisan support, although every attempt was made to coordinate with the resistance movements."²⁴ After the defeat of Germany, many of these OG personnel were re-trained and infiltrated behind Japanese lines to train Chinese guerrillas.²⁵

Probably the most renowned OSS elements were the Jedburgh Teams.²⁶

In early 1944, the OSS began creating the first of 96 three-man Jedburgh teams to provide special operations support for the Allied invasions of France. A typical three-man team consisted of a French officer, an American or British officer and an enlisted radio operator. They were trained in close combat, infiltration and exfiltration techniques, small unit tactics, light weapons, demolitions and a host of other skills necessary for survival behind German lines. The Jedburgh teams were launched into Northern France at and shortly after the

²² Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 145-153.

²³ United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Directorate of History and Museums, *Army Special Operations Forces in World War II* (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USASOC), 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁶ Jedburgh teams took their name from the area of Scotland where the Scots conducted guerrilla warfare against the English during the twelfth century. Leroy Thompson, *The Illustrated History of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1988), 2.

Normandy invasion (Operation Overlord) from various airfields in England and into Southern France just before and after the landings in conjunction with Operation Dragoon.²⁷

The Jedburgh Teams worked with the French resistance to conduct sabotage and direct action operations against German rear elements and made a significant contribution to the Allied invasion efforts.²⁸

The OSS during WWII established the model for UW forces and future special operations. OSS emphasized the need for indirect military skills such as language ability, cultural orientation, and regional expertise as well as direct combat skills such as marksmanship, hand-to-hand combat, clandestine communications, and demolitions. The economy of using small teams, specially organized, trained, and equipped to operate behind enemy lines with indigenous personnel was clearly established. Organizationally, the OSS set a precedence for strategic level special operations and intelligence collection in support of national objectives.

1950's—Organization and Activation of Special Forces

With the end of World War II, all of the OSS elements were disbanded and the military's capability to conduct UW disintegrated. However, the idea of conducting UW was not completely lost. In late 1946, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) conducted a study into the efficacy of organizing an unconventional warfare group with a combination of the OSS and Ranger capabilities.²⁹ The 1947 National Security Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and effectively took the requirement to maintain a UW capability out of the hands of the military. Later, "in mid-1948, [the National Security Council] expanded the CIA charter, which already charged the CIA with the conduct of covert [psychological warfare], to include the conduct of UW in support of resistance/guerrilla movements."³⁰ Consequently, the military did

²⁷ Ibid., 2.

²⁸ Bank, 43-74.

²⁹ Paddock, 70.

³⁰ Bank, 161.

not wholeheartedly pursue a UW capability until the Cold War against the Soviet Union and events in Korea again triggered the need in the early 1950s.

When the North Koreans attacked south on 22 June 1950, the special operations capability within the Far East Command (FECOM) was negligible. This communist-backed invasion, combined with the threat of war in Europe with the Soviet Union, set in action the initiative within the Army to create the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) under the direction of Brigadier General Robert McClure. Officially established on 15 January 1951, the OCPW was concerned primarily with psychological and unconventional warfare. This special staff began the development of the current Army Special Forces organization.³¹

Colonel Aaron Bank and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann developed the concept, organization, and mission for Special Forces based upon their personal UW experiences in WWII. As Colonel Bank stated, "the OSS heritage would be utilized as background for all our concepts of operations, organization, plans, studies, briefings, and training outlines...its mission would be strictly within the spectrum of UW."³² They designed the Special Forces organization around its most basic operational element—the A-team, later known as the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA). The initial concept was to have a 15-man A-team, which could be combined to be the equivalent of the OSS Operational Group or divided into smaller teams equivalent of the OSS Jedburgh Teams. Ultimately the A-team was reduced to twelve men—two officers and ten enlisted men commanded by a captain. They also developed the initial concept for the Special Forces company and battalion. On 19 June 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) was activated under the command of Colonel Bank.³³

Many of the members of the original 10th SFG were Lodge Bill personnel—foreign nationals that enlisted in the United States Army with the incentive of receiving U.S. citizenship for their

³¹ Paddock, 83-89.

³² Bank, 166.

³³ Ibid.

service.³⁴ Recruitment of these personnel into Special Forces underscores the emphasis placed on language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness necessary for effective UW operations. The focus for 10th Group was on Eastern Europe, with its potential to raise large guerrilla formations behind Soviet lines. In 1953, 10th SFG was split in order to create the nucleus of the 77th SFG at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the remainder of 10th Group was moved to Bad Tolz, Germany.

Evolution of the Organization

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him...It requires in those situations where we must encounter it...a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.³⁵

John F. Kennedy
May 25, 1961

Elected in 1952, President Eisenhower was no fan of small wars and his nuclear deterrence strategy focused on the threat of massive retaliation to keep China, the Soviet Union, and their communist allies at bay.³⁶ The United States was concerned about the domino effect of spreading communism in Southeast Asia, but remained focused on a Europe first strategy. Reluctantly, Eisenhower provided France and later Republic of South Vietnam with financial and indirect military support. The commitment of Special Forces in Southeast Asia gradually increased

³⁴ "In 1950, the American Congress approved a bill sponsored by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, authorizing the enlistment of foreign aliens into the U.S. Army and providing for the granting of permanent resident status in the United States to enlistees who honorably completed five years of military service." An Eisenhower administration concept called the Volunteer Freedom Corps, envisioned using young men that had fled Eastern Europe as U.S. military forces to fight communism. In this concept, the aliens would be eligible for American citizenship after a period of service. H.W. Brands, Jr., "A Cold War Foreign Legion? The Eisenhower Administration and the Volunteer Freedom Corps," *Military Affairs* 52, no. 1 (January 1988): 7. Congress of the United States, *United States Code Congressional Service, 81st Congress—Second Session, Chapter 443—Public Law 597, Army—Enlistment of Aliens* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1950), 319. Bank, 168.

³⁵ John F. Kennedy, May 25, 1961; quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 29-30; quoted in Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 13.

³⁶ Adams, 63.

throughout the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Already in the late 1950s, missions existed such as the White Star Program in Laos, where specially organized small teams were sent in as Field Training Teams (FTTs) to organize and train indigenous personnel, the Meo and Kha tribesman, to conduct anticommunist operations.³⁷ By 1960, U.S. SF advisors were also operating with various elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.³⁸

President John F. Kennedy's keen interest in Special Forces and UW spurred a rapid growth in the use of indigenous forces to fight communist-based insurgencies. He recognized Special Forces as a means to engage in these small wars without a major commitment of U.S. ground forces. Special Forces fit nicely into the "flexible response" strategy developed by President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.³⁹ The skills for which Special Forces were formed were not used for their original purpose—to organize and train guerrillas; rather, SF were used in a multitude of applications that required the same skills as UW. The defining mission for SF during this era became counter-insurgency, conducted similar to today's doctrinal mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

Organizationally, Special Forces experienced rapid growth and transformation during the 1960s. Three Special Forces Groups were formed by 1960—the 10th, 77th (later changed to the 7th), and 1st. By mid-1964, four additional groups were formed—the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 8th Groups. The 10th Group focused on Europe, 1st Group on Southeast Asia, 3rd Group on Africa, 5th Group on Vietnam, 6th Group on the Middle East, and 8th Group on Latin America.⁴⁰

Special Action Forces (SAFs) were created in the early 1960s to give the Special Forces Group a broader capability of military assistance missions. Each SAF consisted of "a 1,500-man Special Forces Group backed up by a civil affairs group, a [PSYOP] battalion, an engineer

³⁷ A Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) is a twelve-man element organized so that it can operate in two, nearly identical six-man teams (referred to as split-teams).

³⁸ Thompson, 45-54.

³⁹ Adams, 63-69.

⁴⁰ Thompson, 42-43.

detachment, a medical detachment, an intelligence detachment, an MP [military police] detachment, and an ASA (Army Security Agency—electronic intelligence) unit.⁴¹ Eventually, four SAFs were created, but never fully manned or implemented: one around the 1st SFG for the Far East; the 8th SFG for Latin America; the 3rd SFG for Africa; and the 6th SFG for the Middle East.⁴²

The structure of the SFG changed significantly from 1960 to the early 1970s. In 1961, the SFG consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company and four SF companies. (See Appendix B – The Special Forces Organization, for a diagram of the SFG organizational structures.) The SF company was commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and consisted of an administrative detachment, one SF operational detachment C (SFODC), three SF operational detachments B (SFODB), and 12 SF operational detachments A (SFODA). The SFODB consisted of 23 personnel commanded by a major and a staff similar to today's battalion staff structure (with a captain as the XO and lieutenants as the S1, S2, S3, and S4).⁴³ The June 1965 version of FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, shows that the SFG added a signal company and an aviation company. Additionally, captains now manned the SFODB staff positions.⁴⁴ Doctrinally, SF's primary mission remained UW, but its organization was changing to reflect its utilization for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.⁴⁵

The greatest changes in the SFG structure occurred in the late 1960s, as evidenced by the 1969 version of FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations – U.S. Army Doctrine*. This manual illustrates the first doctrinal SFG structure similar to today's structure. The lieutenant colonel position moved from the company command level to the battalion command. The SFG consisted

⁴¹ Ibid., 42.

⁴² Thompson, 42. Adams, 100-101. Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), 69-70.

⁴³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1961), 18-25.

⁴⁴ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1965), 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 17.

of a headquarters and headquarters company, three SF battalions, and a support battalion. The SF battalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment and three SF companies. Each SF company now consisted of a company headquarters (SFODB) and five SFODAs. The SFODA size increased to 14 personnel (the only time it varied from 12 personnel). Along with structural change came the first significant doctrinal shift in SF's missions. UW was no longer the sole purpose for SF. The 1969 SF doctrinal manual listed the following missions: Unconventional Warfare, Stability Operations, and Direct Action. Additionally, this doctrine specified varying structures for the SF company and SFODA, depending on a direct action or UW mission.⁴⁶

The primary participation of SF in South Vietnam in the early 1960s was through the CIA sponsored and funded Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. "The basic concept of the program was to deny Viet Cong access to the rural population of Vietnam."⁴⁷ The SFODAs operated in the Central Highlands with the local tribes to organize their village defense structure. The use of the SF-trained militia forces eventually evolved to operations in conjunction with offensive combat missions with conventional forces from the Government of Vietnam.

As the conflict's emphasis shifted to conventional operations in the mid-1960s, SF's role evolved from its original function to more direct action and special reconnaissance missions. In early 1964, President Johnson approved a plan for covert operations (Operations Plan 34A) that authorized the formation of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) that became known as MACV-SOG (Military Advisory Command Vietnam – Studies and Observation Group). Although the missions included a variety of unconventional tasks, "the bulk of SOG efforts were directed toward reconnaissance and strike missions in support of MACV's conventional forces...chiefly in Laos and Cambodia."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations – U.S. Army Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1969), 1-2 to 2-16.

⁴⁷ Adams, 83.

⁴⁸ Adams, 123.

The 1974 version of FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations – U.S. Army Doctrine*, reflects the organizational and mission changes that evolved from the Vietnam era. It lists two missions for SF: Unconventional Warfare and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The size of the SFODB was significantly reduced (to five personnel), a sixth SFODA was given to each company, and the SFODA returned to its previous 12-man size.

Following Vietnam, the Army experienced a rapid drawdown in forces and a significant decrease in budget. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the Army re-focused itself on fighting the Soviet Union on the plains of Central Europe. The Army's operational doctrine made significant changes during this period, resulting in the 1986 FM 100-5 *Operations* and Air-Land Battle doctrine. As part of this doctrinal shift, SF missions evolved to focus less on UW and more on their part of Air-Land Battle doctrine – primarily special reconnaissance and direct action missions to assist in shaping the deep battle. The application of UW skills was primarily through FID and support to COIN in countries such as El Salvador. In addition, during the post-Vietnam era, the need for special military units to combat terrorism resulted in its addition as one of SF's primary missions.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent Nunn-Cohen Amendment were instrumental in the evolution of SOF. Lessons learned from Desert One, the aborted mission to rescue U.S. hostages from the American Embassy in Iran (1980), and Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S. invasion of Grenada (1983), resulted in military and congressional initiatives to build a more effective joint special operations capability. In 1986, Senators William Cohen and Sam Nunn cosponsored legislature that resulted in a dramatic reorganization of SOF. The Cohen-Nunn Amendment created the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

(OASD[SOLIC]).⁴⁹ Although not directly a result of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment, on 9 April 1987 Special Forces became an official branch of the Army.⁵⁰

The Gulf War was a watershed event in the evolution of Special Forces. Operations in Southwest Asia truly mark the end of the Cold War era and the beginning of a new era of special operations. Operation Desert Storm was fought as a coalition, but primarily in a conventional manner. Special Forces played a crucial new role as coalition support teams (CSTs) to the Islamic coalition forces from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Oman, Morocco, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar.⁵¹ The 5th Special Forces Group and elements of the 3rd Special Forces Group provided training for these units as well as liaison with the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). SF also conducted some special reconnaissance missions across the border with limited success. The use of Special Forces as CSTs demonstrated yet another application of their flexible skills and marked a transition point for SF to begin returning to its traditional mission of UW.

Current Special Forces Organization

The most recent doctrine for Army Special Forces, FM 3-05.20 *Special Forces Operations*, states that SF is organized, trained, and equipped for seven principal missions: unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), combatting terrorism (CBT), counterproliferation (CP), and information operations (IO). In addition to the primary missions, SF doctrine lists several collateral activities in which they may participate, including coalition support, combat search and rescue (CSAR), counterdrug (CD),

⁴⁹ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 69-147.

⁵⁰ Lawrence P. Crocker, *Army Officer's Guide – 45th Edition* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1990), 506. Authorized by the Secretary of the Army on 9 April 1987 and made official by General Order number 35 on 19 June 1987

⁵¹ United States Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: USDOD, 1992); cited in Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 238.

humanitarian demining (HD), foreign humanitarian assistance (HA), security assistance (SA), and special activities.⁵²

There are currently five active-duty and two National Guard Special Forces Groups (SFGs). The active duty groups are the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 10th and the National Guard groups are the 19th and 20th. The active duty groups are regionally oriented along similar lines with the geographic unified commands. 1st SFG operates in the Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR), 5th SFG in the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR, 7th SFG in the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR, and 10th SFG in the European Command (EUCOM) AOR. 3rd SFG operates across regional commands, primarily in the EUCOM and CENTCOM AORs. However, the recent QDR calls for changes in regional alignment of SOF to account for new regional emphasis in the defense strategy.⁵³

The SFG is a flexible, multipurpose organization designed to support special operations activities in any environment across the spectrum of conflict. The SFG is commanded by a colonel and is similar in organizational structure to a conventional brigade or regimental organization. The SFG has a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), group support company (GSC), and three SF battalions (See Appendix B – Special Forces Organization). The GSC provides the intelligence, signal, and combat service support (CSS) to the SFG.⁵⁴ When augmented, the SFG can operate as a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters.

The SF battalion of a SFG consists of a battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (also known as the SFODC), a Battalion Support Company (BSC), and three SF companies. The SF battalion plans, conducts, and supports special operations activities and is responsible for isolating, deploying, controlling, sustaining, recovering, and reconstituting SFODBs and

⁵² Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001), 2-1. See Appendix A for explanation of Special Forces missions and collateral activities.

⁵³ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 27.

⁵⁴ *Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations*, 3-1 to 3-10. See Appendix B – Special Forces Organization.

SFODAs. When augmented, the SFODC can function as the headquarters for an Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF).⁵⁵

The SF company consists of a Company Headquarters (SFODB) and six SFODAs. Its primary purpose is command and control (C2) and may serve as an advanced operational base (AOB), a special operations command and control element (SOCCE), an isolation facility (ISOFAC), or conduct SF operations within a designated area of operations.⁵⁶

The SFODB is a ten-man element commanded by a major. Doctrinally, it consists of a commander, executive officer (XO), operations warrant officer, sergeant major, operations sergeant, assistant operations sergeant, supply sergeant, medical sergeant, and two communications sergeants. Many of the SFODB functions require augmentation from one of the SFODAs or external assets in order to adequately conduct its mission for a sustained duration.⁵⁷

The SFODA is the most basic organizational element in SF. Designed specifically to conduct UW, it has changed very little since 1952. The SFODA consists of twelve men commanded by a captain, which include: detachment commander, assistant detachment commander (SF warrant officer), operations sergeant, assistant operations sergeant, two weapons sergeants, two engineer sergeants, two medical sergeants, and two communications sergeants. The SFODA is designed to operate in two six-man teams of nearly equal composition. By table of organization and equipment (TOE), each SF battalion has one SFODA trained in underwater operations (UWO) and one SFODA trained in military free-fall parachuting (MFFP). All SFODAs typically specialize in some particular method of infiltration or type of operation, such as Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC), advanced special operations (ASO), military mountaineering, maritime operations, or vehicle operations.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Ibid., 3-17.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 3-25 to 3-26.

⁵⁷ *Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations*, 3-26.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 3-29.

Since the end of the Gulf War, Special Operations Forces have conducted extensive deployments outside the continental United States (OCONUS). They have proven to be the force of choice in many instances to deal with the post-Cold War security environment. In the *Joint Force Quarterly* article "Special Operations Forces in Peacetime," John Collins reported that Army Special Forces spent 53,555 man-weeks in 129 countries OCONUS in Fiscal Year 1998 alone.⁵⁹ Recent major operational commitments for SF involving application of UW skills include Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, counterdrug operations in Columbia, and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. A more thorough analysis of the decade since the Gulf War and the major U.S. military operations will show how the environment has changed and the nature of Special Forces operations has evolved because of it.

⁵⁹ John M. Collins, "Special Operations Forces in Peacetime," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 21 (Spring 1999): 61.

CHAPTER 3

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Released from the grip of a bi-polar power structure, nations, transnational actors, and non-nation state entities are free to challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare. Information technology, transportation technology, the acceleration of the global economic community and the rise of networked society all impact the [current global] trends.⁶⁰

*TRADOC White Paper:
Capturing the Operational Environment
February 2000*

The decade since the end of the Gulf War has been called a "strategic pause."⁶¹ During this time, the United States has faced no peer competitor as it did with the Soviet Union before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although operationally busy with peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and other stability and support operations, no significant threat challenged the United States' national security or vital interests.⁶² Consequently, the Army focused on downsizing and transforming to prepare for an uncertain future threat. The terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 was an alarming wake-up call to the U.S. about the threats we face now and in the future. That attack effectively ended the strategic pause.

The contemporary operational environment (COE) refers to the complex global environment the United States faces today. It is more than just the forces that pose a direct security threat to the United States. The COE is a global system of systems, comprising of numerous variables that interact to create intertwined national, political, economic, social, spiritual, cultural, and military interests, challenges, and threats. It is the environment that resulted from rapid advances in

⁶⁰ Combined Arms Center Threat Support Directorate, *White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2000).

⁶¹ Robert H. Scales, Jr. Future Warfare Anthology (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: United States Army War College, 2000), 148.

⁶² Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-15 to 1-16. "Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis relieve suffering."

technology, the shift in power created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, traditional cultural, religious, and ethnic rivalries, economic interdependence, and the complex dynamics of a single global super-power.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the COE in order to derive requirements for the future Special Forces organizational structure. To this end, this chapter first analyzes recent literature describing the COE. To chart the operational realities of the changing environment, this chapter also describes and analyzes major Special Forces operations since the end of the Gulf War. This shows that SF missions have evolved over the past decade to meet evolving operational requirements.

The description of characteristics and trends of the COE come primarily from three sources: The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century Phase I Report – *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century* (1999); the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) *White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment* (2000); and the United States Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (2001).⁶³ These three documents provide perspective of the COE from the Clinton administration (1999), the Army (2000), and the Bush administration (2001). The recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is used as the framework for discussion in this paper. Comparison of the three documents shows there are no significant changes in the United States' view of the national security environment from 1999 to 2001. The difference for the 2001 QDR is the predictions of the previous two documents (i.e. potential attack within the U.S. homeland) had already come to fruition.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recently published the draft version of its new opposing force (OPFOR) doctrine. In it, TRADOC has developed a

⁶³ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 1999). Combined Arms Center Threat Support Directorate, *White Paper: Capturing the Operational Environment* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: United States Army Training and

contemporary OPFOR based on a generic nation-state and incorporates the multitude of contemporary threats and other actors that the U.S. military will face in today's complex world environment. This emerging doctrine calls the complex world environment the contemporary operating environment (COE). The recent draft FM 7-100, *OPFOR: Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy* divides the elements influencing the COE into nation-state and non-nation actors.⁶⁴ Nation-states include "core states, transition states, rogue states, and failed or failing states."⁶⁵ Non-nation actors "include rogue actors, third-party actors, the media, and multinational corporations. Examples [of rogue actors] include insurgents, guerrillas, mercenaries, and transnational or subnational political movements. [Third-party actors include] refugees and other civilians on the battlefield, including international humanitarian relief agencies."⁶⁶

Describing the COE

Characteristics

In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas L. Friedman calls today's complex international system "globalization."⁶⁷ It is the foremost characteristic describing the COE. Competition between the United States and the Soviet Union defined the Cold War system. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the breaking down of the international barriers imposed by the Cold War system is re-shaping the world. The Cold War system characterized by "the division of countries into enduring and ideologically defined geopolitical blocs, has become more fluid and

Doctrine Command, 2000).

⁶⁴ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-100, OPFOR: Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy (Draft)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), vi-vii.

⁶⁵ Ibid., vi.

⁶⁶ Ibid., vii.

⁶⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Random House, 2000), 7.

unpredictable.⁶⁸ This change has opened travel, communication, and commerce between countries that were rivals in the previous system.⁶⁹ Friedman defines globalization as the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before—in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporations, and nation-states farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before.⁷⁰

Globalization is shaped by rapid advances in technology such as the internet, cellular phones, satellite communications, and fiber optics that allow rapid communication and have exponentially increased the rate of change, innovation, and commerce. These technologies allow information to flow to the farthest reaches of the world instantaneously. Companies are able to manage business ventures and investments effectively from remote places. The media is capable of near real-time reporting of critical events as they occur even in the most remote places such as Kandahar, Afghanistan. The military is capable of precision strikes with here-to-fore unheard of sensor-to-shooter integration.

Another important characteristic of the COE is urbanization. An increasing percentage of the world's population lives in urban areas. "The UN [United Nations] projects that by 2025, sixty percent of the world's population (5 billion people) will live in urban areas."⁷¹ The likelihood of future military operations in urban areas is very high. Future threats will likely seek the sanctuary of urban areas to mitigate the U.S. technological advantage and increase the threat of collateral damage from strikes, even if precision munitions are used.

A critical aspect of the COE is the global balance of power. The United States is the unrivaled, sole super-power in the world and has the ability to alter the balance of power in any region diplomatically, economically, or militarily. Because of globalization, the interests of the

⁶⁸ Rumsfeld, 3.

⁶⁹ Friedman, 1-16.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 9.

⁷¹ Paul K. Van Riper, "A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain," *Marine Corps Gazette* 81, no. 4 (October 1987), A-1; quoted in Lester Grau and Jacob Kipp, "Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter," *Military Review* LXXXIX, no. 3 (July-August 1999), 10-11.

United States are broad and multi-faceted. A complex balance of power exists between the U.S. and other nation-states, the global marketplace, and non-state actors.⁷² "The United States will continue to be the hegemon and will be globally engaged (politically, technologically, economically and militarily). [Although] nation-states are still [the] dominant actors...some power is shifting to non-traditional actors. Political, economic, cultural, religious, and environmental actors [are challenging] existing power structures without regard for tradition."⁷³

Trends

The recent Quadrennial Defense Review divides the trends that effect the global security environment into two major categories: key geopolitical trends and key military-technical trends. These ten trends show threats and opportunities that will shape the U.S. strategy now and into the future.

The key geopolitical trends are:

- Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance.
- Regional security developments.
- Increasing challenges and threats emanating from territories of weak and failing states.
- Diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors.
- Developing and sustaining regional security arrangements.
- Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of conflict.

The key military-technical trends are:

- Rapid advancement of military technologies.
- Increasing proliferation of CBRNE [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive] weapons and ballistic missiles.
- Emergence of new arenas of military competition.
- Increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise.⁷⁴

The recent terrorist event proved that the United States is no longer immune to threats within its borders. The geographic protection it once enjoyed (or at least perceived) no longer exists.

⁷² Friedman, 13.

⁷³ Combined Arms Center Threat Support Directorate, 6.

⁷⁴ Rumsfeld, 3-7.

Economic globalization has increased travel and trade, consequently making America more vulnerable to infiltration and attack by asymmetric means. In addition, the threat of ballistic missile attack from rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks from non-state actors hostile to the U.S. continues to rise. Many of the hostile entities seek to acquire CBRNE weapons and use them against the U.S.⁷⁵

Recent operations in Afghanistan highlight the diverse sources and locations of conflict the U.S. will face in the future. Afghanistan presented the U.S. a variety of operational challenges. Its physical location made it difficult to reach by carrier-based aircraft and the limited airfields in friendly or allied countries. Its rugged, mountainous terrain, caves, harsh climates, and urban areas posed challenging conditions for U.S. soldiers to operate. Initially, the Taliban operated in urban areas, using the threat of collateral damage for protection. Later, after coalition bombing efforts took their toll, they abandoned their efforts and fled to the rugged mountainous regions where they could melt into the tribal population. Al Qaeda forces hid amongst the labyrinth of natural and man-made tunnels along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Conditions in Afghanistan do not provide a prescription to model future military capabilities; rather, Afghanistan provides a good example of the complex environments that U.S. forces could face in the future.

Although the U.S. does not expect a peer competitor in the near future, there is a significant potential for regional powers to threaten critical U.S. interests. Areas of particular concern in the QDR are the Middle East and Asia.⁷⁶ These regions are fraught with instability from religious differences, traditional ethnic rivalries, and critical resources such as water and oil. Much of this region is fragmented along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines. The 1999 Hart-Rudman Commission report predicted that fossil fuel will remain the primary energy source in the

⁷⁵ Rumsfeld, 4. Hart and Rudman, 4. Combined Arms Center Threat Support Directorate, 7-15.

⁷⁶ Rumsfeld, 4.

foreseeable future, and oil from the Middle East and Central Asia are critical resources that will remain of strategic importance.⁷⁷

The fight against terrorism will take military operations into traditional areas of U.S. national interest, but also into areas previously of little concern and likelihood of action. The ability of terrorist organizations to train, sustain, plan, and operate in remote and unstable regions poses a clear threat now. Until 11 September 2001, the deplorable conditions in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban regime were not of significant enough interest for the U.S. to conduct military operations in that region. The effects of globalization – technology, freedom of travel, and satellite communications – provide international terrorist organizations the means to operate effectively from remote regions, while financing, training, recruiting, supporting, and conducting operations from a variety of locations around the globe.

The United States faces a significant threat to its national interests and security from regions with weak, failing, and failed states.⁷⁸ Many states are unable to provide the political, economic, and social infrastructure needed in the rapidly changing world. Such states willingly or unwillingly provide sanctuary and support for international terrorist and crime organizations. These states provide organizations such as Al Qaeda, a radical fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organization, the ability to gain and project asymmetric power globally. Such states are also a greenhouse for traditional religious and ethnic conflicts to grow, with consequences spilling across borders and around the world. As a world leader and the sole superpower, the U.S. faces a changing threat and definition of national interests, which may include a moral obligation to intervene and provide support to unstable situations globally.

The core elements of the nature of conflict have not changed in the COE – it is still brutal, bloody, and ugly. However, the mode of conflict is changing in response to the environment. Martin van Creveld, a historian at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, provides an interesting

⁷⁷ Hart and Rudman, 5.

⁷⁸ Rumsfeld, 5.

analysis of contemporary war in his 1991 book *The Transformation of War*.⁷⁹ In it, he looks at the nature of conflicts since 1945 and finds that nuclear power has been of little consequence and conventional warfare insignificant, relative to the number of conflicts since World War II. What was significant during this period (1945 – 1990) were low intensity conflicts.

Since 1945 there have been perhaps 160 armed conflicts around the world, more if we include struggles like that of the French against Corsican separatists and the Spanish against the Basques. Of those, perhaps three quarters have been of the so-called 'low-intensity' variety (the term itself first appeared during the 1980s, but it aptly describes many previous wars as well). The principle characteristics of low-intensity conflict (LIC) are as follows: First, they tend to unfold in 'less developed' parts of the world; the small-scale armed conflicts which do take place in 'developed' countries are usually known under a variety of other names, such as 'terrorism,' 'police work,' or—in the case of Northern Ireland—'troubles.' Second, very rarely do they involve regular armies on both sides, though often it is a question of regulars on one side fighting guerrillas, terrorists, and even civilians, including women and children, on the other. Third, most LICs do not rely primarily on the high-technology collective weapons that are the pride and joy of any modern armed force. Excluded from them are the aircraft and the tanks, the missiles and the heavy artillery, as well as many other devices so complicated as to be known only by their acronyms.⁸⁰

Not only have LICs been more prevalent, they have been bloodier, claiming millions more lives than the conventional conflicts, and the results of many have been conclusive.⁸¹ Ten years later, van Creveld's analysis may have proven to be fairly accurate. The number of LICs has increased while the occurrence and likelihood of conventional war has decreased. The Gulf War probably decreased the likelihood of conventional war by demonstrating to the world the United States's overwhelming conventional warfare capability.⁸² In this respect, the U.S. has dictated the mode of future conflict in the near term by forcing the rest of the world (at least potential adversaries) to seek asymmetric means to confront the mighty U.S. military.

⁷⁹ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

⁸⁰ Ibid., 20.

⁸¹ Ibid., 20-21.

⁸² The Gulf War reduced the likelihood of conventional war more than if it did not happen. Had the Gulf War not happened, the U.S. would have remained wedded to the doctrine and capabilities of the Cold War, where the U.S. was designed to fight the Soviet system. During the Gulf War, the world saw the awesome demonstration of U.S. military capability, technology, and might, thus the potential of conventional confrontation has been deterred. Major Rob Forte, lecture discussion at the School of Advanced Military Studies, 4 January 2002. The U.S. has a very robust asymmetric warfare capability as well. Whether the U.S. has the political will to fully employ this capability remains unanswered.

Future adversaries of the United States (in the near to mid-term) will likely use asymmetric methods to accomplish their objectives. Asymmetric warfare is the most daunting trend in the COE because it seeks advantage in unexpected areas using unexpected means.⁸³ Knowing that the U.S. has maintained a technologically superior force, adversaries will continue to seek ways to attack U.S. vulnerabilities and mitigate its strengths. In Kosovo, Serbian ground forces negated the effects of Allied reconnaissance and precision bombing by dispersing forces and using decoys where real ground weapon systems had previously been. Al Qaeda terrorists flew U.S. commercial Boeing 767 aircraft into the World Trade Center towers using suicide pilots that had lived and trained in the United States. These terrorists effectively leveraged western democratic freedoms and its open society, including immigration laws and educational opportunities in conjunction with security vulnerabilities in the airline industry to create mass effects significantly disproportionate to the resources invested. Computer technology is providing future adversaries another means of asymmetry, enabling communications and allowing network organizations to operate in the seams of traditional hierarchical organizations.⁸⁴ This is the environment the U.S. must adapt its military forces, including SOF, to work in.

Recent Special Forces Operational Trends

Since the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall, SOF have had to perform a variety of missions that fall under the category of 'Operations Other Than War.' At one time, these operations were considered extraordinary, but in the 1990s, operations other than war had become the norm. For example, in its first 40 years, the UN conducted only 13 such operations, but in the years from 1988 to 1994, the number of peace operations more than doubled. Although peace operations were not new to the 1990s, what was unprecedented were the numbers, pace, scope, and complexity of recent operations...SOF have participated in these types of operations, often as the lead military organization. Such capabilities as cultural and language

⁸³ The following definition of asymmetric warfare was collectively developed during the School of Advanced Military Studies Asymmetric Warfare Elective (January 2002): Asymmetric warfare is the deliberate application of power using different, disproportionate and adaptive ways and means that is oriented by a continuous assessment of the opponent's vulnerabilities and not easily countered without a significant reorganization or redistribution of means in order to accomplish a specific aim.

⁸⁴ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2001); online at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/>.

familiarity, warrior-diplomat skills, and maturity and professionalism made SOF an ideal force for these operations.⁸⁵

From the end of the Gulf War, beginning with Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq up to the time of this writing, Special Forces missions have shown a trend of migration back to its UW roots. The post-Cold War environment has provided numerous opportunities and challenges for unconventional warfare skills to be applied around the globe. These operations typically start as distinctly humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, or peacekeeping operations, but the complexity and evolutionary nature of these operations made SF the appropriate enabling force for the situation. Later operations, such as the ongoing missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the operations in the Afghanistan region are even more unconventional in nature. In fact, the recent operations with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan may be the closest thing to doctrinal UW conducted since SF officially formed in 1952.

Almost immediately following the ground war against Iraq in 1991, elements of the 10th Special Forces Group were deployed to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance operations (FHAO) in Northern Iraq. The Kurdish population in that region had risen in rebellion against the Iraqi government, fueled by nationalism, coalition rhetoric, and results of the ground war. Following the cease-fire, Iraqi forces viciously subdued the uprising, causing the Kurds to flee into the mountains of Northern Iraq along the Turkish and Iranian borders. 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group was already familiar with the Northern Iraq region from the combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions it had conducted in support of the Gulf War. They were quickly inserted into the region as the lead element of a combined task force with the mission of stabilizing the dire humanitarian emergency situation by establishing refugee camps and managing the initial life-saving logistics effort in a protected zone vicinity Zakho, Iraq. Although

⁸⁵ United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) History and Research Office, *United States Special Operations Command – History* (MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.: USSOCOM, 1998), 56-57.

the purpose of the mission was humanitarian assistance, the nature of the operation was clearly unconventional warfare.⁸⁶

We treated this like a UW operation. We used all of our skills and techniques associated with UW to accomplish the mission. We assessed, made contact with [unknown indigenous personnel] and built rapport. We organized an indigenous populace into a hierarchical organization that could very easily become a military unit. We identified key leaders and skilled personnel...We also identified other skilled men in the populace who could be trained to operate radios, become medics, etc.⁸⁷

The mission was volatile and dangerous dealing with armed factions within the Kurdish population in a semi-permissive environment.⁸⁸ Interviews with SFODA commanders who served in Operation Provide Comfort indicate that there were no operational shortcomings due to the SFODA structure, although mission-specific augmentation was required (linguists, female doctors/nurses).⁸⁹

Special Forces were involved in three phases of the military operations in Somalia that spanned from August 1992 to March 1994. These operations included UNOSOM (United Nations Operations Somalia) I, a humanitarian assistance mission, UNITAF (United Task Force), a broader humanitarian assistance mission that included limited military action, and UNOSOM II, that involved active combat and nation building.⁹⁰ During UNOSOM I (Operation Provide Relief), elements of 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group supported relief flights coming out of Kenya with an "airborne reaction force" as well as conducting area assessments on the ground in Somalia. After deploying into Somalia in December 1992 to support UNITAF (Operation Restore Hope), SF soldiers continued operating in remote areas, making contact with the

⁸⁶ Jeff Goble, Provide Comfort Experience, personal email, 23 January 2002. William H. Shaw, *Operation Provide Comfort – Northern Iraq Experience*, personal email, 4 February 2002.

⁸⁷ Goble, 23 January 2002.

⁸⁸ Adams, 244-248.

⁸⁹ Goble, 23 January 2002; Shaw, 4 February 2002.

⁹⁰ Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 13-14; United Nations Department of Public Information, *Somalia – UNOSOM I* (United Nations, 1997). The first two operations in Somalia are also known as UNOSOM I. UNITAF is also known as Operation Restore Hope.

indigenous population and leaders, gathering intelligence in support of force protection measures, and conducting further area assessments in support of humanitarian relief operations.⁹¹

In September 1994, elements of 3rd Special Forces Group were inserted into the Haitian countryside as part of U.S. conventional and United Nations peacekeeping operations to restore democratic rule and stability to Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy and United Nations Mission in Haiti [UNMIH]). Initially the operation was planned as a forced entry operation to remove the ruling junta from power and return the democratically elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide to rule the country. The last-minute change of heart by the ruling junta allowed a peaceful entry of forces and rapidly changed the context of the operation. The SF missions were assistance to the local government, disarmament of the Forces Armee de Haiti (FAd'H), and coalition support. The SFODAs operated in remote areas of the countryside, conducting a multitude of tasks varying from civil-military operations (repairing facilities and infrastructure) to nation-building. These teams essentially moved into areas devoid of effective governmental infrastructure and facilitated the stabilization of power and rebuilding of essential governmental functions. Although not specifically trained "to midwife village politics in a Third World nation," the nature of these missions were ideally suited for SF's skills – language abilities, regional expertise, inter-personal communications, and the ability to operate effectively and independently in austere environments.⁹²

Another ongoing SF mission that developed in the 1990s was support to the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). As a result of horrific atrocities and genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and similar unrest in other African countries, the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense worked together to develop a plan to train African peacekeeping troops. Battalion-sized

⁹¹ USSOCOM, *United States Special Operations Command – History*, 43-45.

⁹² Ibid., 276. Steve Meddaugh, Commander, C Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group in Haiti from 15 July 1995 to 29 October 1995., interview by author, 23 January 2002, tape recording, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

units from several African nations have been trained by U.S. SOF, with a large proportion of the task resting on SF.⁹³

The largest ongoing SF missions until September 2001 were those missions in support of peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. On the ground in Bosnia, the SF missions and task organization have gone through several evolutions since they began in late 1995 as part of Operation Joint Endeavor. Operation Joint Endeavor was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation to implement the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords and the accompanying Military Technical Agreement. During Joint Endeavor, SF's primary mission was to support the coordination of foreign military forces with the NATO operation. These liaison coordination elements (LCEs) operated much like the coalition support teams (CSTs) during Operation Desert Storm, facilitating communications, command and control, liaison, as well as coordinating close air support, fires, and medical evacuation as necessary. The SF missions scaled down over time as the NATO operation transitioned to Operation Joint Guard (December 1996) and later to Operation Joint Forge (June 1998).

A new intelligence-focused mission known as joint commission observers (JCOs) emerged during Operation Joint Guard. SFODAs established semi-permanent outposts where they could establish and maintain contact with the local factions in order to provide ground truth information to the chain of command.⁹⁴ Both the LCE and JCO missions emphasize the UW characteristics of SF that make them ideally suited for these missions – language skills, interpersonal communications, regional expertise, and the maturity to operate independently in a potentially hostile environment. The JCO mission shows a distinct evolution in the application of these capabilities to support human intelligence (HUMINT) requirements in the COE.

The ongoing Special Forces missions in Kosovo as part of Operation Joint Guardian are very similar to those in Bosnia. In Kosovo, Special Forces are also conducting LCE and JCO

⁹³ USSOCOM, *United States Special Operations Command – History*, 60.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 53-56.

missions. The nature of the environment in Kosovo is somewhat different than in Bosnia, though. In Bosnia, the missions were dealing with separation of warring factions. However, in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an insurgency, which provides different challenges and opportunities, such as demobilization.

Recent Special Forces operations in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom provide a classic example of unconventional warfare in a contemporary setting. In response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States deployed to the Afghanistan region and began operations to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist network operating there and to remove the illegitimate Taliban government of Afghanistan that provided sanctuary and support to Al Qaeda. The U.S. inserted SFODAs into Afghanistan to linkup with Taliban opposition forces (collectively referred to as the Northern Alliance) beginning in October 2001. These SFODAs advised and assisted the opposition forces as well as coordinated U.S. air attacks against Taliban and eventually Al Qaeda forces. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heaped praise on the SF soldiers' initiative and flexibility in accomplishing their mission, using photos of SF soldiers riding on horses with opposition forces as an example of their ability to adapt to the austere and ambiguous environment. The rapid advance of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban shows the tremendous asymmetry created by a small element capable of synergistically linking low-tech opposition ground forces with overwhelming U.S. air power technology (i.e. precision guided munitions).

A significant trend in SF operations in the past decade is the joint, multinational, and interagency (J/MN/IA) nature of all of these operations. SF is part of the inherently multi-service SOF community will always work in a joint context. Although SF can operate unilaterally, the capability and skills most often used is their ability to work with personnel and military forces from foreign countries. The ability to network SOF capabilities with other government agencies has also proven critical in developing operational synergy and desired effects in situations that do not clearly fall in one department's purview. The most recent operations against terrorism show

an even greater interagency effort, with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel working directly with SF personnel in some cases. Operation Anaconda, the operation in eastern Afghanistan to capture or kill a pocket of regrouping Al Qaeda, showed the close integration of SF with conventional, joint, and multinational forces.⁹⁵

Recent operations have shown the value of SF in supporting intelligence collection efforts. The ability to build rapport and operate amongst the indigenous population has enabled SF to provide important human intelligence to support force protection, SOF intelligence requirements, and joint force intelligence requirements. Language skills and regional expertise continue to be critical skills for SF soldiers to conduct these missions.

Operations in the past decade have continued to place a high demand on SF medical expertise to support operations. SF medics have always been in high demand, but the nature of recent operations has increased their significance even further. During Operation Provide Comfort, male SF medics were not sufficient to meet the operational requirements within cultural constraints. Female doctors and nurses were required to augment SFODAs to care and treat the indigenous female population.

Analysis of the COE, recent operations, and the nature of ongoing operations provide the foundation for identifying potential changes required in the Special Forces organization. The COE is influencing the nature of U.S. military activity and operations. Recent operations show the U.S. is turning to SOF at an increasing rate, largely due to their UW capability. The number of sustained special operations missions is increasing, and will likely continue to increase in support of the global fight against terrorism. Another special operations contingent deployed in mid-January 2002 to the Philippines to assist the Philippine government in counter-insurgency

⁹⁵ Vernon Loeb and Bradley Graham, "Seven U.S. Soldiers Die in Battle," *Washington Post*, 5 March 2002. Online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38477-2002Mar4.html>. "Senior Pentagon officials said between 800 and 900 American troops, leading a 2,000-man allied force that included Afghans and troops from at least six other Western countries, were attacking al Qaeda fighters in pockets across the region...[including] troops from the Army's 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain divisions...[and] several hundred special operations soldiers from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,

operations against the Islamic terrorist organization, Abu Sayyaf. Other mission to fight the war on terrorism in places like Yemen, Somalia, and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia are developing as this paper is written. These will add to the ongoing special operations mission in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Columbia, which are all employing sizable SF elements (company or larger).

Germany, Norway and other countries."

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Special Forces are able to achieve US objectives by working through, with, and by indigenous and surrogate forces. This results in an economy of force well beyond the resources invested. Special Forces' ability to teach, train, advise, and organize friendly military, paramilitary, and other indigenous or surrogate forces and persuade and apply these forces to US objectives is Special Forces' core Objective Force capability [emphasis in the original]. This is why Special Forces are called Warrior-Diplomats.⁹⁶

The COE is influencing change in the SF organization directly and indirectly. The direct influences are from the increased demand for HUMINT and increased availability and use of information technologies. The increase in the number and scope of special operations in military operations in the COE is indirectly influencing the organization. This chapter discusses changes in the SF structure in the following categories: personnel, command and control (C2), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS). This chapter also recommends three potential courses of action (COAs) for implementing changes in the SF organization.

Analysis

A review of the Vietnam era changes shows that the operational environment during that period had a similar effect on the SF organizational structure. The operational environment during the Vietnam era was similar to today in that there was a surge in the use of SF and their UW skills. During Vietnam, as now, SF was not used for UW in the traditional sense of the mission—organizing guerrillas or partisans behind enemy lines. However, the nature of the operations each require SF's ability to teach, train, advise, and organize indigenous personnel. The result of this increased emphasis on SF during the 1960s was rapid growth and change in the organizational structure. (See Appendix B – Special Forces Organization for diagrams of the SFG structures.) From 1961 to 1965, a signal company and aviation company were added, and

⁹⁶ USASOC, *Objective Force Concept and Wargame Results – Initial Report (DRAFT)*, 3-4.

by 1969 the SFG had an entire support battalion. During the same timeframe, the command and control structures grew to include battalion level organizations. The number of SFODAs actually reduced from forty-eight in 1961 and 1965 to forty-five in 1969, but later increased to fifty-four in 1974 and remains until now (see Table 2 – Total SF Operational Detachments). It is reasonable to deduce that the number and scope of operations thus had a significant impact on the C2, CS, and CSS assets in the SFG.

	Battalion	Company	C-Team	B-Team	A-Team
1961	0	4	4	12	48
1965	0	4	4	12	48
1969	3	9	3	9	45
1974	3	9	3	9	54
1981	3	9	3	9	54
1990	3	9	3	9	54
2001	3	9	3	9	54

Table 2: Total SF Operational Detachments⁹⁷

With the war on terrorism the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) for special mission units (SMUs) with specific counter-terrorism (CT) capabilities has increased significantly. However, their size limits the number of operations that they can physically handle. With this, the SF community as a whole will likely increase the number of CT missions it conducts. Due to the classified nature of SMU organization and operations, this analysis and recommendations does not discuss specific details or requirements for these types of operations. However, it is clear that the additional missions for regular SF units for CT will increase their OPTEMPO and many of the recommendations listed herein will support that increased requirement.

C2, CS, CSS

The number and scope of special operations being conducted today in the COE is having a similar affect on the current SF support organization as it did in Vietnam (see Table 3 – Group Support Assets). The increase in number of special operations is probably having the single

⁹⁷ FM 31-21, 1961, 19-20. FM 31-21, 1965, 19-32. FM 31-21, 1969, 2-2 to 2-25. FM 31-21, 1974,

greatest impact on the SF organizational structure. The size and number of sustained special operations missions has increased throughout the 1990s and has dramatically increased to support Operation Enduring Freedom. The operational tempo (OPTEMPO) is demanding an increase in C2, CS, and CSS assets. Unlike Vietnam, which was conducted in a single theater of operation, the global war on terrorism will be conducted in multiple theaters, requiring potentially greater supporting assets.

	Group Support Assets	Battalion Support Assets	Company Support Assets
1961			Admin Detachment
1965	Signal Company Aviation Company		Admin Detachment
1969	Support Battalion - HQ and Service Company - Medical Platoon - Admin. Services Plt. - Support & Maint. Plt. - Aviation Platoon - Signal Company		
1974	Service Company - Medical Platoon - Logistics Platoon - Admin Services Platoon - Aviation Platoon Signal Company		
1981	Service Company - Medical Platoon - Logistics Platoon - Admin Services Platoon - Aviation Platoon Signal Company Combat Intelligence Company		
1990	Support Company - Military Intelligence Det. - Service Detachment - Signal Detachment - Aviation Platoon Chemical Detachment	Support Company - Military Intelligence Det. - Service Detachment - Signal Detachment	
2001	Support Company - Military Intelligence Det. - Service Detachment - Medical Section - Signal Detachment - Personnel Section Chemical Detachment	Support Company - Service Detachment - Signal Detachment	

Table 3: Group Support Assets⁹⁸

2-1 to 2-16. FM 31-21, 1981, 3-2 to 3-9. FM 31-21, 1990, 4-1 to 4-16. FM 31-21, 2001, 3-1 to 3-28.

⁹⁸ Ibid. The Chemical Detachments are USASFC assets attached to the SFG.

The SOF support structure above SFG level is not designed to support multiple sustained operations. Within the Army SOF organization, the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and the 112th Signal Battalion are only designed and equipped to support two joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) simultaneously.⁹⁹ The SFGs are not manned and equipped to function as a JSOTF without this external augmentation for SOF-specific signal and support capabilities.

It is questionable how long the current force structure can cycle forces through the number of missions that are ongoing without breaking the force. The scope of many missions in the COE requires a SFODB or larger element, and these require augmentation from battalion and group for signal and intelligence assets. The deployment of SF units must account for a traditional system to refit, train, and prepare for future operations as well as the myriad of smaller peacetime SF missions that support regional theater engagement plans. Shortcomings in the current C2, CS, and CSS structure prohibit multiple sustained special operations on the scale required for the near future without a significant detrimental affect on the organization.¹⁰⁰ In order to continue, or increase, these sustained special operations in the COE, the C2, CS, and CSS structures will have to grow to support the operational detachments. Increases in these assets are required at the company, battalion, and group levels to be deployable and operate effectively in a joint, multinational, and interagency environment without significant augmentation.

⁹⁹ "The mission of the ARSOF Signal Battalion (A) is to provide operational and tactical communications support to JSOTF commanders in support of geographical CINCs' deliberate plans and crisis action operations in up to two theaters simultaneously." Additionally, there is a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida with the primary mission is of providing communications support for two simultaneously deployed JTFs and two JSOTFs. Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.10.1, Army Special Operations Forces Command, Control, Communications, and Computers* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 2000), 3-1 to 3-2.

¹⁰⁰ During Operation Joint Endeavor, December 1995 to December 1996, 10th SFG rotated battalions to Bosnia. This essentially consumed the entire group. One battalion was preparing for Bosnia, one battalion conducting the mission, and one battalion refitting from their rotation. With other missions and requirements continuing during this period, the sustained operations in Bosnia had a detrimental impact on 10th SFG's ability to train and prepare for other missions. Sustained special operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kuwait show the difficulty of one SFG maintaining the mission. In each of these missions, other groups (with other regional orientation) eventually took over some/all the missions requirements.

Personnel

Increased emphasis on HUMINT and information technologies will affect personnel, training, and organizational structure. Technology has certainly not rendered human intelligence (HUMINT) obsolete. Recent operations show the need for HUMINT to fill intelligence collection gaps that electronic sensors cannot fill. SF can provide critical HUMINT to support the information superiority required for full spectrum dominance envisioned in Joint Vision 2020.¹⁰¹ In a peacetime environment, as the number of forward-based conventional forces decreases, SF will play an increasing role in theater engagement strategies. It is evident that the U.S. may need to respond to threats anywhere in the world. SF can provide the military an economy of force with the appropriate skills to engage the remote regions of the world and develop relationships that will support future operational intelligence needs.

The SF force structure needs to increase its HUMINT capability at all levels, from Group down to the SFODA. This will support requirements for force protection as well as SOF and joint intelligence requirements. Additional intelligence personnel, specially trained in HUMINT, are needed at the SFODA and SFODB levels to accommodate this requirement. SF is considering allowing females in its force structure to accommodate this requirement.¹⁰² In many regions of the world, male-female interaction is publicly limited or forbidden, creating a segment of population that is inaccessible to the average, male SF soldier. Although female operators will create some unique challenges, it is imperative that SF address these challenges in order to provide the HUMINT required. Regional expertise and language skills will continue to be an imperative to enable SF to integrate and operate with indigenous personnel. These skills also enable SF to provide HUMINT. SF needs to seek new and innovative ways to train its operators and develop or acquire this regional expertise. SF also needs to consider alternative methods to recruit personnel with unique expertise and language skills in a particular region of the world.

¹⁰¹ Shelton, 6-10.

¹⁰² USASOC, *Objective Force Concept and Wargame Results – Initial Report (DRAFT)*, 11.

The increasing use and dependence on information technologies throughout the military is another area that is dictating change within the SF force structure. Personnel at every level, from SFODA to Group, are needed to operate the myriad of computers and electronic devices used to facilitate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). At a minimum, this requires enhancing the training for the SF communications sergeant. SF needs to consider adding new military occupation specialties (MOSSs) to fulfill these emerging requirements.

The SFODB is not robust enough to conduct sustained, 24-hour operations without augmentation from SFODAs and external sources. The primary missions for a SFODB to man and operate are the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), Isolation Facility (ISOFAC), and Advanced Operations Base (AOB). Each of these missions requires the SFODB to run 24-hour operations often with similar staff functions of a conventional battalion tactical operations center (TOC). The problem is the SFODB only has ten personnel assigned to it under the current table of organization and equipment (see Figure 2 – Composition of a SFODB). To perform these missions effectively requires eighteen to twenty-one personnel, including special skills augmentation. This allows enough personnel to support two 12-hour shifts to man the critical staff function (intelligence, operations, communications, fires, and administrative/logistics), allow for a shift officer in charge (OIC), and give the Commander and Sergeant Major freedom to supervise the operation without being tied down in a staff role. To add to the personnel shortcoming, most SF Groups do not fill the company executive officer position.¹⁰³ This is not due to a shortage of officers, but an officer career development system that fears conventional perceptions that company executive officers are lieutenants, not captains.

¹⁰³ Typically, the XO positions are not filled. The active duty SF Groups currently fill the company XO position in the companies designated as a CIF (CINC inextremist force). These include one company per SFG (C/1/1st, B/2/3d, A/1/5th, C/3/7th, and C/1/10th). Besides these, in the past year, there have been only five other XO positions filled at any one time, leaving the remaining 35 position empty. CPT Frederick Prins, email message, subject: *RFI on Company XO Fill Rates* (Fort Bragg, N.C.: USASOC DCSPER, 30 January 2002).



Figure 1: Composition of a SFODB¹⁰⁴

The SFODB needs to be increased in size to fourteen to eighteen personnel.¹⁰⁵ The additional personnel should be communications, intelligence, and computer specialists. The executive officer position needs to be filled by a captain that has already served as a detachment commander, so that he has the experience necessary to support operations effectively at that level. The executive officer position should also be re-named to operations officer to diminish the stigma associated with a captain as a company executive officer. Operations officer would more accurately describe the role of the officer when the SFODB is performing its operational mission.

The twelve-man SFODA has proven to be an effective and flexible force structure as the basic operational element. Since 1952, its doctrinal structure only changed once during the Vietnam War, and it quickly returned to the twelve-man structure in the mid-1970s. Increasing the size may be required to provide the additional intelligence and computer technology specialists required to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict in the COE. However,

¹⁰⁴ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations*, 3-26.

¹⁰⁵ The SFODB is typically augmented with SF personnel taken from a SFODA and low-density military occupation specialties (i.e. communications maintenance technicians, mechanics, and counter-intelligence specialists). Increasing the SFODB size would alleviate the need to augment it with SF

the needed changes may be made through changes in MOS training. This study did not find significant impetus to change the SFODA structure.

As the SF organization transforms over the next several years, it needs to be careful to identify positions at the company, battalion, and group levels that can be filled with non-18-series personnel. Even within the SFODB there may be some positions (i.e. routine administrative duties) that don't require SF skills. It is imperative that SF soldiers are not encumbered with these duties. It would be easier to fill these positions with non-SF personnel that do not require the extensive time and resources to recruit and train. Non-SF staffing may alleviate some of the SF recruiting burden as the emphasis on special operations continues. The ARSOF truths spell out the personnel focus that must be maintained:

Humans are more important than hardware. People—not equipment—make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and working as a team, will accomplish the mission with the equipment available. Yet the best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of the right people.

Quality is better than quantity. A small number of people, carefully selected, well-trained, and well-led are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be fully capable.

ARSOF cannot be mass-produced. It takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency needed to accomplish difficult and specialized ARSOF missions. Integration of mature, competent individuals into fully capable units requires intense training, both in the ARSOF schools and units. Hastening this process only degrades the ultimate capability.

Competent ARSOF cannot be created after emergencies arise. Creation of competent, fully mission-capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable ARSOF elements on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available ARSOF units in peacetime.¹⁰⁶

Before recommending courses of action (COAs) for SF to deal with the COE, it is important to review the primary issues this study has identified. The first issue is a matter of quality of SF operators—the need for SF soldiers (operators) with the right skills to conduct UW effectively in the COE. The second issue is a matter of quantity of SF operators—having a sufficient number of SF soldiers to conduct the number of operations that are required. The last issue is the ability

personnel.

¹⁰⁶ Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999), 1-12.

of the SF organization to command and control, support, and integrate with the joint and interagency community the number of sustained special operations that will be required in the near future.

Issues that are not a result of the COE must also be considered in order to recommend viable COAs. The Army continues to be an all-volunteer force, and SF soldiers are volunteers within that force. The size of the conventional Army from which SF recruits these volunteers has reduced dramatically since 1991, yet the active duty SF organization has not reduced in size at all. This alone makes it a challenge to recruit the number of qualified personnel to fill the SF ranks. In addition to this, SF organization has become a mature branch since being officially formed in 1987. With this, opportunities for promotion and growth within the branch have stabilized. That by itself would be considered a good thing, except it limits promotion as an incentive for remaining on active duty. A reflection of the maturity of the organization is the large number of enlisted and warrant officers eligible for retirement in 2003. These conditions could potentially compound the recruiting problem, just to sustain the force structure SF currently has.

Recommendations

In the following section, this paper will recommend three potential COAs for SF to implement organizational changes. A tiered approach is used to address the primary issues listed above sequentially (quality of SF operators, quantity of SF operators, and C2/CS/CSS). A tiered approach will allow SF to deal with the issues in a logical sequence, focusing on the essential changes first, then increasing size and scope as time and resources become available. Regardless of the COA that is adopted, there are some essential requirements common to any COA that must be adopted.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ The recommendations identified from this study of the COE are consistent with the concepts being developed by USASFC and USASOC for the interim and objective force SFG design. The nature of the changes proposed for the objective force SFG are similar to those proposed in this paper. The objective force concept proposes an elevated rank structure at all levels. USASOC, *Objective Force Concept and Wargame Results – Initial Report (DRAFT)*.

In order to change the SF organization to deal with the requirements of the COE, there are some basic changes that must be implemented that are essential to all. The first requirement is for SF to modify its MOS-specific training to account for the changing skills required in the COE. The skills specifically identified in this study include primarily HUMINT and information technology skills. In other words, no matter what SF chooses to do, it must adapt its skill-sets to the current and future environments to ensure it is capable of effectively conducting UW. This deals with the first issue – quality of SF.

The second basic requirement is for SF to man its operational detachments fully, especially the SFODAs. To do this, the "padded" positions at battalion and group that absorb SFODA personnel strength must be eliminated or become authorized positions on the table of organization and equipment (TOE). Staff positions at all levels within the SFG need to be scrutinized to identify positions that do not require 18-series personnel to fill. It is critical that SF operators are doing jobs that require SF operators! A selection process should be instituted to allow non-SF personnel to work in SF organizations, yet maintain the high standard required in any SOF unit. For example, an infantry non-commissioned officer (NCO), that has served in the Ranger Regiment (another SOF unit) could serve as the S-3 Air NCO at battalion and group. He would have many (if not all) the requisite skills required to do this job. Yet, there wouldn't be the large recruiting and training requirement. This is just one example of many positions that can be adequately filled with non-SF personnel. Beyond this, SF units should be authorized to man its operational units at 110-115 percent strength. Increased manning authorizations will allow operational units to send operators to required career-development schools, language training, and special skills training without sacrificing operational ability.

The first course of action would change nothing organizationally beyond the requirements listed above that are common to all. However, this may require changes in the way SF operates. Without organizational growth in both operational units and C2/CS/CSS assets, SF may have to narrow the focus of its missions (i.e. say no to some of the tasks it has been doing over the past

decade) and let the conventional Army pick up some of these SOF-like operations. Another change that may be required is a closer working relationship with conventional forces. As operational SF units are finite in number, they may need to be augmented with select conventional forces to conduct certain missions. For example, conventional forces may provide MOS-specific skills required to train foreign forces, with the SF capabilities being used economically to provide language and cultural expertise required to work effectively. This deals indirectly with the issue of quantity of SF operators, but does not effectively address the issue of C2/CS/CSS.

The second course of action is to increase the size of the SFODB and add an operational specialists detachment at the battalion and group levels.¹⁰⁸ A larger SFODB as discussed earlier in this chapter will allow it to conduct its operational missions without internal augmentation (i.e. from SFODAs) and minimal external augmentation, tailored specifically for the mission.¹⁰⁹ The biggest change in this COA would be adding the operational specialists detachments. These detachments would be a place within the SFG structure where highly specialized regional experts could be pooled, then task organized with SFODAs and SFODBs as missions required. This would be an ideal position for mature SF NCOs and warrant officers (WOs) that have developed extensive regional, country, and language experience.¹¹⁰ Non-SF regional and language experts may also be recruited into the SF organization to serve in these detachments. This would also be the ideal location for females and additional doctor and nurses (including females). The additional doctors and nurses should be pooled together in the detachment at group level.

The last COA would increase the C2, CS, and CSS capability of the SF battalion and group. As with the other COAs, it would incorporate the requirements common to all. Ideally, it would

¹⁰⁸ The objective force concept (draft) has a similar detachment called the Special Augmentation Detachment. USASOC, *Objective Force Concept and Wargame Results – Initial Report (DRAFT)*, 7.

¹⁰⁹ The objective force concept (draft) increases the SFODB to nineteen personnel. USASOC, *Objective Force Concept and Wargame Results – Initial Report (DRAFT)*, 6.

¹¹⁰ In areas of operations such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia, language skills are particularly difficult to develop (i.e. languages such as Arabic, Persian Farsi, and Chinese).

incorporate the recommendations in the second COA, but could be implemented independent of those changes. The primary requirement is to equip the battalion and group signal and military intelligence detachments with the C4I assets required to operate as an ARSOTF (at battalion level) and JSOTF (at group level). The secondary requirement is to equip the support detachments with the resources to operate these headquarters. The specific details for these C2, CS, and CSS changes are beyond the scope of this monograph. However, it is clear the SF organization is limited in its ability to support the multiple sustained operations that will be required in the COE.

No matter what changes are implemented in the SF organization, detailed analysis will need to be conducted. Much of this is underway already at USASFC and USASOC. The findings and recommendations in this study are consistent and supportive of the initial work being produced by these organizations. The urgency for developing and implementing these recommended changes has never been greater.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The global environment in which the U.S. military operates has changed dramatically over the past decade. U.S. conventional superiority has driven current and future adversaries to seek unconventional and asymmetric means to achieve their objectives. To meet this unconventional threat adequately, the U.S. will have to fight fire with fire. That is, they will need to employ unconventional forces. The increased rate of employment of U.S. unconventional forces over the past decade reflects the impact of the changing operational environment. Army Special Forces is the right tool for the job in many cases and will play an even greater role in future military strategies.

In the wake of initial operations against global terrorism, it is clear that the trend of increased U.S. participation in unconventional warfare will continue into the near future. In the 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush made it clear to the United States and the world that this war will not be short or easy; but he also made it clear that the United States would not falter—it would commit the resources required to defeat the terrorist threat.¹¹¹

Analysis of the COE shows that there are some direct effects of the COE on the SF organization. These direct influences demand qualitative changes in the SF organization. The SF force structure needs to evolve to meet rising HUMINT and technology requirements. This will require adjustments in existing 18-series MOS training and skills as well as additional positions to accommodate specific HUMINT and technological requirements. The threats of the future will continue to work to defeat the U.S. conventional military (and technological superiority). Special Force's ability to operate through, with, and by surrogate and indigenous forces will make it a

¹¹¹ George W. Bush, *State of the Union Address* (Washington, D.C.: 29 January 2002); full text online at: <http://www.msnbc.com/news/696171.asp> (30 January 2002).

vital HUMINT resource to support information superiority and full spectrum dominance.¹¹² SF organizations at all level will be required to interface with command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems that will enable the timely transmission of this information.

Analysis of the COE shows that the changes in the SF structure are needed in order to conduct the number and scope of unconventional operations required in the future. This is the indirect effect of the COE on the SF structure through increased operations. The first step towards this requirement is to structure the SF company, battalion, and group to be deployable and operational without significant external augmentation. This does not mean increasing the number of SF groups—it means enabling the existing operational elements with the support structure required to conduct multiple sustained operations. This means an increase in the logistical and communications structures at all levels, but primarily at battalion and group. It is imperative to structure these organizations to keep the number of operators used to augment higher headquarters to a minimum.

Although the full impact of the changes wrought by 11 September 2001 will not be fully apparent for some time to come, it is likely that emphasis on Special Forces' UW capability will increase dramatically. As this paper is being written, requirements to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom in the Afghan region and throughout the world are still being battle-tested and adapted. The United States has embarked on a global war against terrorism that may require multiple, sustained special operations in several theaters of operation. In the wake of this crisis, the emphasis on Special Forces and their unique skills has risen dramatically. U.S. Army Special Forces are much better postured for the challenges of the future than its predecessors following WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The requirement to adapt to the surrounding environment will require ongoing, innovative efforts by the entire special operations community.

¹¹² Shelton, 6-10.

Suggested Further Research

In the process of researching and writing this monograph, some related topics surfaced that warrant further research. These topics will add to the body of research regarding the SF force structure and its ability to conduct UW in the future:

Alternative recruiting methods for SF.

SF/SOF involvement in homeland defense and the effects on the organization.

Lessons learned from SF organizational change during the Vietnam era.

SF operations in Northern Iraq.

APPENDIX A – SPECIAL FORCES MISSIONS AND COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES

Special Forces Missions¹¹³

Unconventional Warfare. UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR).

Foreign Internal Defense. The participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the actions or programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Direct Action. DA operations are normally short-duration operations involving a precision attack to seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a target, or to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material. These operations include sniper operations, direct assault, raids, terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions, sabotage, and personnel recovery.

Special Reconnaissance. SR is the SF reconnaissance mission, normally in support of strategic or operational objectives. SF are used when conventional or tactical collection assets are unable to collect information of strategic or operational significance.

Combatting Terrorism. CBT are the offensive and defensive measures taken by civilian and military agencies to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. This includes offensive counter-terrorism (CT) measures and defensive anti-terrorism (AT) measures. SF may support other government agencies (i.e. Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, and Department of Transportation).

Counterproliferation. CP is a specialized mission assigned to designated SOF and usually pertains to counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CPWMD). These elements are specially designated, task organized, trained, and equipped for this mission.

Information Operations. SF may support IO through many of their missions and collateral activities. They may be offensive or defensive in nature.

Special Forces Collateral Activities¹¹⁴

Coalition Support. Any actions taken by Special Forces Liaison Elements (SFLEs) to improve the interaction and interoperability of coalition partners and U.S. military forces. SFLEs provide critical C4I links, advise and assist their foreign counterparts, provide training, provide situational awareness, assist in fire support planning, and enable overall coordination.

¹¹³ FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2-1 to 2-82.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 2-83 to 2-95.

Combat Search and Rescue. CSAR includes the process of reporting, locating, identifying, recovering, and repatriating isolated personnel to friendly control.

Counterdrug Activities. CD activities are measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. They include training host nation CD forces and supporting regional CD campaign plans overseas.

Humanitarian Demining Activities. HDO is the assistance provided to a host nation to remove mines and unexploded ordinance, including training and awareness programs.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. U.S. military support to promote human welfare; reduce pain, suffering, and hardship; and to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters.

Security Assistance. The provision of defense equipment and training to eligible countries and international organizations to further U.S. national security objectives. SF primarily support SA activities by providing mobile training teams (MTTs).

Special Activities. Any activities specially directed by the President with congressional oversight.

APPENDIX B – SPECIAL FORCES ORGANIZATION




Figure 2: Special Forces Group (1961)¹¹⁵




Figure 3: Special Forces Group (1965)¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, 1961, 19-21.

¹¹⁶ FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, 1965, 19-23.




Figure 4: Special Forces Group (1969)¹¹⁷




Figure 5: Special Forces Group (1974)¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations – U.S. Army Doctrine*, 1969, 2-2.

¹¹⁸ FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations – U.S. Army Doctrine*, 1974, 2-1.




Figure 6: Special Forces Group (1981)¹¹⁹




Figure 7: Special Forces Group (1990/2001)¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ FM 31-22, *Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations*, 1981, 3-2.

¹²⁰ FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, 1990, 4-2 to 4-12. FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, 2001, 3-1 to 3-25.

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